Understanding the Trinity as a doctrine.
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Isa 9:6 has been dealt with over and over, I guess you simply don't understand.
New Info: "
New Info: "
- Isaiah 9:6 tn This title must not be taken in an anachronistic Trinitarian sense. (To do so would be theologically problematic, for the “Son” is the messianic king and is distinct in his person from God the “Father.”) Rather, in its original context the title pictures the king as the protector of his people. For a similar use of “father” see Isa 22:21 and Job 29:16. This figurative, idiomatic use of “father” is not limited to the Bible. In a Phoenician inscription (ca. 850-800 b.c.) the ruler Kilamuwa declares: “To some I was a father, to others I was a mother.” In another inscription (ca. 800 b.c.) the ruler Azitawadda boasts that the god Baal made him “a father and a mother” to his people. (See ANET 499-500.) The use of “everlasting” might suggest the deity of the king (as the one who has total control over eternity), but Isaiah and his audience may have understood the term as royal hyperbole emphasizing the king’s long reign or enduring dynasty (for examples of such hyperbolic language used of the Davidic king, see 1 Kgs 1:31; Pss 21:4-6; 61:6-7; 72:5, 17). The New Testament indicates that the hyperbolic language (as in the case of the title “Mighty God”) is literally realized in the ultimate fulfillment of the prophecy, for Jesus will rule eternally."
John 4:23-24
New English Translation
23 But a time is coming—and now is here—when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for the Father seeks[c] such people to be[d] his worshipers.[e] 24 God is spirit,[f] and the people who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.”
Jesus is speaking about his Father. This text does not say the Father came in the flesh.
John 14:7-11
Easy-to-Read Version
7 If you really knew me, you would know my Father too. But now you know the Father. You have seen him.”
8 Philip said to him, “Lord, show us the Father. That is all we need.”
9 Jesus answered, “Philip, I have been with you for a long time. So you should know me. Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father too. So why do you say, ‘Show us the Father’? 10 Don’t you believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The things I have told you don’t come from me. The Father lives in me, and he is doing his own work. 11 Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and the Father is in me. Or believe because of the miracles I have done.
Fullness of Godhead is in Jesus body. Jesus is speaking of the nature of God the Father and his is the same.
New English Translation
23 But a time is coming—and now is here—when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for the Father seeks[c] such people to be[d] his worshipers.[e] 24 God is spirit,[f] and the people who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.”
Jesus is speaking about his Father. This text does not say the Father came in the flesh.
John 14:7-11
Easy-to-Read Version
7 If you really knew me, you would know my Father too. But now you know the Father. You have seen him.”
8 Philip said to him, “Lord, show us the Father. That is all we need.”
9 Jesus answered, “Philip, I have been with you for a long time. So you should know me. Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father too. So why do you say, ‘Show us the Father’? 10 Don’t you believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The things I have told you don’t come from me. The Father lives in me, and he is doing his own work. 11 Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and the Father is in me. Or believe because of the miracles I have done.
Fullness of Godhead is in Jesus body. Jesus is speaking of the nature of God the Father and his is the same.
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with <the Father> and the Word was <the Father>." (john 1:1)
We can algebarically substitute the words <the Father> when it says "God" in John 1:1 because 1 Corinthians 8:6, James 3:9 (kjv), Romans 15:6, and Ephesians 4:6 say clearly that God is the Father.
So, when it says that "the Word became flesh" (John 1:14) we can also algebraically substitute <the Father> there; so that it reads, <the Father> became flesh."
We can algebarically substitute the words <the Father> when it says "God" in John 1:1 because 1 Corinthians 8:6, James 3:9 (kjv), Romans 15:6, and Ephesians 4:6 say clearly that God is the Father.
So, when it says that "the Word became flesh" (John 1:14) we can also algebraically substitute <the Father> there; so that it reads, <the Father> became flesh."
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John 1:1c refers to the nature of the word, not a person.
PROS
with the acc[usative] of a person, after verbs of remaining, dwelling, tarrying, etc. (which require one to be conceived of as always turned towards one)...after EIMI...Jn i.1 (Thayer).
be (in company) with someone...J 1:1f (BAGD).
a marker of association, often with the implication of interrelationships...'the Word was with God' Jn 1:1 (Louw &
PROS
with the acc[usative] of a person, after verbs of remaining, dwelling, tarrying, etc. (which require one to be conceived of as always turned towards one)...after EIMI...Jn i.1 (Thayer).
be (in company) with someone...J 1:1f (BAGD).
a marker of association, often with the implication of interrelationships...'the Word was with God' Jn 1:1 (Louw &
Nida)
Some commentators, such as JFB, above, see PROS in this verse as shorthand for the idiomatic expression PROSÔPON PROS PROSÔPON (literally "face to face"). This seems view is given weight by the context, in which the Son is said to be "in the bosom of the Father" (v. 18), and thus in the ideal position to declare the Father to the world.
TON THEON, literally "the God," is in the accusative case, which makes this the direct object of the second clause (hO LOGOS is in the nominative, and is thus the subject). There is no difference in meaning between THEON here and THEOS in the next clause; they are the same word in different cases. The article TON (accusative form of hO) indicates a personal distinction. As Karl Rahner and others have noted, the articular form of THEOS in the New Testament usually refers to the Father (Rahner, p. 146; Harris, Jesus, p. 47). Thus, saying "the Word was with (the) God" is the same as saying "the Word was with the Father."
THEOS EN HO LOGOS. The first task of the translator faced with this clause is to determine the subject. In most sentences or clauses (such as John 1:1b), the noun in the nominative case is the subject. The noun in the accusative case is the direct object. However, in Greek, "copulative" verbs (generally a form of "to be" or "to become") take the nominative case, not the accusative. Technically, a copulative verb does not ascribe an action, but predicates something about the subject. The "object" of a copulative verb, therefore, is called the "Predicate Nominative (PN)," not the direct object. As we have seen, EN is a form of the verb "to be." Therefore, both THEOS and LOGOS are in the nominative case - one is the subject and the other the PN. In such cases, if one noun has the article and the other does not, the noun with the article is the subject (see Dana and Mantey, p. 148; McGaughy, p. 50; etc.). Thus, hO LOGOS is the subject of the sentence; THEOS is the PN. "The Word was God," not "God was the Word." While the latter is not impossible from the standpoint of pure grammar, McGaughy's study makes it highly unlikely.
So, John is telling us something about the LOGOS - that He is THEOS. The $64,000 question, then, is what does John mean by this? Since THEOS is anarthrous, does he mean that the Word was "a god" (indefinite)? Or does he mean that the Word is God (definite)? Or does he mean that the Word has all the qualities and attributes of God (qualitative)? To answer this essential question, we will need to review how several prominent grammarians have viewed this issue.
Pre-Colwell
Before E.C. Colwell wrote his landmark study (see below), many scholars viewed THEOS in John 1:1c as qualitative:
"It is necessarily without the article (not) inasmuch as it describes the nature of the WOrd and does not identify His Person. It would be pure Sebellianism to say 'the Word was " (Westcott).
" (convertible terms) would have been pure Sabellianism.... The absence of the article here is on purpose and essential to the true idea" (Robertson, Grammar, pp. 767-768).
" emphasizes Christ's participation in the essence of the divine nature" (Dana and Mantey, p. 140).
" without the article signifies divine essence, or the generic idea of God in distinction from man and angel; as , ver. 14, signifies the human essence or nature of the Logos" (Lange)
" sine artic. essentialieter, cum artic. personaliter" (Chemnitz).
"must then be taken as implying God, in substance and essence, not ,'the
...
Some commentators, such as JFB, above, see PROS in this verse as shorthand for the idiomatic expression PROSÔPON PROS PROSÔPON (literally "face to face"). This seems view is given weight by the context, in which the Son is said to be "in the bosom of the Father" (v. 18), and thus in the ideal position to declare the Father to the world.
TON THEON, literally "the God," is in the accusative case, which makes this the direct object of the second clause (hO LOGOS is in the nominative, and is thus the subject). There is no difference in meaning between THEON here and THEOS in the next clause; they are the same word in different cases. The article TON (accusative form of hO) indicates a personal distinction. As Karl Rahner and others have noted, the articular form of THEOS in the New Testament usually refers to the Father (Rahner, p. 146; Harris, Jesus, p. 47). Thus, saying "the Word was with (the) God" is the same as saying "the Word was with the Father."
THEOS EN HO LOGOS. The first task of the translator faced with this clause is to determine the subject. In most sentences or clauses (such as John 1:1b), the noun in the nominative case is the subject. The noun in the accusative case is the direct object. However, in Greek, "copulative" verbs (generally a form of "to be" or "to become") take the nominative case, not the accusative. Technically, a copulative verb does not ascribe an action, but predicates something about the subject. The "object" of a copulative verb, therefore, is called the "Predicate Nominative (PN)," not the direct object. As we have seen, EN is a form of the verb "to be." Therefore, both THEOS and LOGOS are in the nominative case - one is the subject and the other the PN. In such cases, if one noun has the article and the other does not, the noun with the article is the subject (see Dana and Mantey, p. 148; McGaughy, p. 50; etc.). Thus, hO LOGOS is the subject of the sentence; THEOS is the PN. "The Word was God," not "God was the Word." While the latter is not impossible from the standpoint of pure grammar, McGaughy's study makes it highly unlikely.
So, John is telling us something about the LOGOS - that He is THEOS. The $64,000 question, then, is what does John mean by this? Since THEOS is anarthrous, does he mean that the Word was "a god" (indefinite)? Or does he mean that the Word is God (definite)? Or does he mean that the Word has all the qualities and attributes of God (qualitative)? To answer this essential question, we will need to review how several prominent grammarians have viewed this issue.
Pre-Colwell
Before E.C. Colwell wrote his landmark study (see below), many scholars viewed THEOS in John 1:1c as qualitative:
"It is necessarily without the article (not) inasmuch as it describes the nature of the WOrd and does not identify His Person. It would be pure Sebellianism to say 'the Word was " (Westcott).
" (convertible terms) would have been pure Sabellianism.... The absence of the article here is on purpose and essential to the true idea" (Robertson, Grammar, pp. 767-768).
" emphasizes Christ's participation in the essence of the divine nature" (Dana and Mantey, p. 140).
" without the article signifies divine essence, or the generic idea of God in distinction from man and angel; as , ver. 14, signifies the human essence or nature of the Logos" (Lange)
" sine artic. essentialieter, cum artic. personaliter" (Chemnitz).
"must then be taken as implying God, in substance and essence, not ,'the
...
It is important to note that these scholars did not use the term "qualitative" to describe their view of THEOS in John 1:1c. Prior to Phillip B. Harner's study of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns (see below), "qualitative" nouns were viewed more or less as indefinite nouns. These scholars would probably have described THEOS as definite, but not as a convertible term with hO THEOS in John 1:1b. Indeed, Julius Mantey, in his famous letter to the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, cites Colwell's study as 'proving' that THEOS in 1:1c is definite, though it is clear from what he wrote in his Manual Grammar several years before that by this he does not see definiteness as requiring convertibility. Convertible terms are 100% equivalent, such as "Jesus" and "Son of God" in this sentence: "Jesus is the Son of God." We can reverse the terms without changing the meaning: "The Son of God is Jesus." If THEOS in 1:1c is convertible with hO LOGOS, John would be teaching that the LOGOS is 100% equivalent to the hO THEOS of 1:1b, which would be conducive to some form of Modalism.
These scholars all argue that the anarthrous PN preceding the copulative verb stresses the nature of THEOS. As we will see, this is precisely the way later scholars described a "qualitative" noun - one that stresses the qualities, attributes, or nature of the noun.
Colwell's Rule
In 1933, E.C. Colwell published his now famous study of the use of the article with PNs occurring both before and after the verb. Colwell began by identifying a number of PNs which he believed were definite by virtue of the context. He then performed a statistical analysis of their occurrence - either before or after the verb - and with the article or without. He found that 87% of definite PNs before the verb occurred without the article. He "tentatively" offers a rule which, in part, stipulates: "Definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article" (Colwell, p. 20). Colwell reasons:
But it is in the realm of translation and interpretation that the data presented here have their most valuable application. They show that a predicate nominative which precedes the verb cannot be translated as an indefinite or a "qualitative" noun solely because of the absence of the article; if the context suggests that the predicate is definite, it should be translated as a definite noun in spite of the absence of the article (IBID, p. 20).
Thus, Colwell's study indicates that THEOS in John 1:1c should not be translated as an indefinite noun solely on the basis of the absence of the article. Colwell, like most grammarians prior to Harner (see below), considered "qualitative" nouns to be more or less equivalent to indefinite nouns. Recall, though, that Colwell studied only nouns which he had identified as definite based on the context - he did not study all nouns in the New Testament. Thus, some scholars have questioned Colwell's further application of his rule:
Loosely speaking, this study may be said to have increased the definiteness of a predicate noun before the verb without the article, and to have decreased the definiteness of a predicate noun after the verb without the article.
The opening verse of John's Gospel contains one of the many passages where this rule suggests the translation of a predicate as a definite noun. looks much more like "And the Word was God" than "And the Word was divine" when viewed with reference to this rule. The absence of the article does not make the predicate indefinite or qualitative when it precedes the verb; it is indefinite in this position only when the context demands it. The context makes no such demand in the Gospel of John, for this statement cannot be regarded as strange in the prologue of the gospel which reaches its climax in the confession of Thomas (IBID, p. 21).
Based on his data gathered from known definite nouns, Colwell extrapolated that more or less the same statistical balance would prove true with nouns that were exegetically questionable. As we shall see below, subsequent studies have called this extrapolation into question, particularly those that emphasize qualitativeness as a semantic force independent of definiteness or indefiniteness.
At the same time, the vast majority of commentators (e.g., Carson) and some grammarians (e.g., Metzger) have accepted Colwell's conclusions regarding John 1:1, as has at least one major study (see Lane McGaughy, below). As with their earlier counterparts, these more recent scholars do not perceive definiteness as requiring convertibility, but rather emphasize that the nature of THEOS is ascribed to the Word: "The 'Word does not Himself make up the entire Godhead; nevertheless the divinity that belongs to the rest of the Godhead belongs also to Him'" (Tasker, The Gospel According to St. John, p. 45, quoted in Carson, p. 117). They are thus not far semantically or exegetically from those who argue for a qualitative or qualitative-definite semantic force for THEOS in 1:1c.
Maximilian Zerwick
These scholars all argue that the anarthrous PN preceding the copulative verb stresses the nature of THEOS. As we will see, this is precisely the way later scholars described a "qualitative" noun - one that stresses the qualities, attributes, or nature of the noun.
Colwell's Rule
In 1933, E.C. Colwell published his now famous study of the use of the article with PNs occurring both before and after the verb. Colwell began by identifying a number of PNs which he believed were definite by virtue of the context. He then performed a statistical analysis of their occurrence - either before or after the verb - and with the article or without. He found that 87% of definite PNs before the verb occurred without the article. He "tentatively" offers a rule which, in part, stipulates: "Definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article" (Colwell, p. 20). Colwell reasons:
But it is in the realm of translation and interpretation that the data presented here have their most valuable application. They show that a predicate nominative which precedes the verb cannot be translated as an indefinite or a "qualitative" noun solely because of the absence of the article; if the context suggests that the predicate is definite, it should be translated as a definite noun in spite of the absence of the article (IBID, p. 20).
Thus, Colwell's study indicates that THEOS in John 1:1c should not be translated as an indefinite noun solely on the basis of the absence of the article. Colwell, like most grammarians prior to Harner (see below), considered "qualitative" nouns to be more or less equivalent to indefinite nouns. Recall, though, that Colwell studied only nouns which he had identified as definite based on the context - he did not study all nouns in the New Testament. Thus, some scholars have questioned Colwell's further application of his rule:
Loosely speaking, this study may be said to have increased the definiteness of a predicate noun before the verb without the article, and to have decreased the definiteness of a predicate noun after the verb without the article.
The opening verse of John's Gospel contains one of the many passages where this rule suggests the translation of a predicate as a definite noun. looks much more like "And the Word was God" than "And the Word was divine" when viewed with reference to this rule. The absence of the article does not make the predicate indefinite or qualitative when it precedes the verb; it is indefinite in this position only when the context demands it. The context makes no such demand in the Gospel of John, for this statement cannot be regarded as strange in the prologue of the gospel which reaches its climax in the confession of Thomas (IBID, p. 21).
Based on his data gathered from known definite nouns, Colwell extrapolated that more or less the same statistical balance would prove true with nouns that were exegetically questionable. As we shall see below, subsequent studies have called this extrapolation into question, particularly those that emphasize qualitativeness as a semantic force independent of definiteness or indefiniteness.
At the same time, the vast majority of commentators (e.g., Carson) and some grammarians (e.g., Metzger) have accepted Colwell's conclusions regarding John 1:1, as has at least one major study (see Lane McGaughy, below). As with their earlier counterparts, these more recent scholars do not perceive definiteness as requiring convertibility, but rather emphasize that the nature of THEOS is ascribed to the Word: "The 'Word does not Himself make up the entire Godhead; nevertheless the divinity that belongs to the rest of the Godhead belongs also to Him'" (Tasker, The Gospel According to St. John, p. 45, quoted in Carson, p. 117). They are thus not far semantically or exegetically from those who argue for a qualitative or qualitative-definite semantic force for THEOS in 1:1c.
Maximilian Zerwick
Zerwick's introductory grammar first appeared in Latin in 1944. A revised and expanded edition was published in 1960, and an English translation with further additions followed three years later. Zerwick admits that Colwell has presented "not a few persuasive examples" that definite nouns preceding the verb usually appear without the article, but he cautions: "[Colwell's] theory has its appeal, but it is not easy to admit that the reason for this use of the article it to be found in a circumstance (order of words) which seems to belong to an altogether different category' (Zerwick, p. 56), Zerwick echoes other grammarians in viewing nouns without the article as being primarily qualitative:
The omission of the article shows that the speaker regards the person or thing not so much as this or that person or thing, but rather as such a person or thing, i.e. regards not the individual but rather nature or quality. (Zerwick, p. 55, emphasis in original).
Zerwick conflates qualitative and indefinite nouns into a single category and places THEOS in John 1:1c in that category:
for in the nature of things, the predicate commonly refers not to an individual or individuals as such, but to the class to which the subject belongs, to the nature or quality predicated of the subject; e.g. Jo 1,1 , which attributes to the Word the divine nature (, at least in NT usage, would signify personal identity of the Word with the Father, since the latter is ) (IBID).
In fact, this one mention of "class" is the only time Zerwick may be inferred to understand indefiniteness to be present in an anarthrous noun at all. His entire discussion of the non-use of the article centers on the qualitative aspects ascribed to the subject. Thus, for Zerwick, nouns are either definite or qualitative, and membership in a class is secondary to the attributes, characteristics, or qualities ascribed to the subject when the author omits the article.
Clause A, with an arthrous predicate, would mean that logos and theos are equivalent and interchangeable. There would be no ho theos which is not also ho logos. But this equation of the two would contradict the preceding clause of 1:1, i
Blass, Debrunner, and Funk
The Blass and Debrunner grammar, translated and revised by Robert Funk, generally endorses Colwell's study, but notes: "[Colwell] deals only with sentences in which the verb appears and only with nouns which are unambiguously definite" (BDF, p. 143). The latter point will be developed in greater detail by Dixon (see below) with regard to the application of Colwell's Rule and John 1:1c. Blass and Debrunner have little to say about predicate nouns which lack the article, but in reference to Mark 7:15 remark: "the idea which runs through the whole discourse is that there really is something which produces this effect, and this given category is now referred to a particular subject" (IBID). Thus, it may be inferred that Blass and Debrunner view anarthrous nouns in much the same was as Zerwick, primarily ascribing qualities or characteristics to the subject rather than membership in a class (the category itself is "referred" to the subject - the subject is not said to be placed in the category).
Lane McGaughy
McGaughy's published dissertation on the use of the Greek verb EINAI ("to be") has been widely recognized for its thoroughness. McGaughy examines Colwell's statistics and finds several of the "exceptions" to his rule that Colwell noted are, in fact, not exceptions at all. Thus several scholars have recognized McGaughy as supporting Colwell's conclusion that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (e.g., Carson, p. 137) or has even given it greater weight (e.g., Grudem, p. 234, n. 12 ). McGaughy says that John 1:1 "should be translated 'And the Word was God' rather than 'And the Word was divine'" (McGaughy, p. 77). He cites Zerwick approvingly: "A noun preceding the verb and lacking the article should not be regarded as 'qualitative' on the mere grounds of the absence of the article" (IBID). Interestingly, McGaughy has not, to my knowledge, addressed Harner's article (which appeared one year after McGaughy's study), which distinguishes between a qualitative meaning and the weaker adjectival "divine" which McGaughy argues against.
Phillip B. Harner
The impact of Phillip B. Harner's study of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns on the interpretation of John 1:1 cannot be overemphasized. Harner noted that "Colwell was almost entirely concerned with the question whether anarthrous predicate nouns were definite or indefinite, and he did not discuss at any length the problem of their qualitative significance" (Harner, p. 76). Again, Colwell, like most older grammarians, saw qualitative nouns as more or less the same as indefinite nouns.
Harner argues that qualitativeness should be considered a semantic force in its own right:
This study will suggest that anarthrous predicate nouns preceding the verb may function primarily to express the nature or character of the subject, and this qualitative significance may be more important that the question whether the predicate noun itself should be regarded as definite or indefinite (IBID, p. 75).
Harner says that qualitativeness may coexist with either a definite or indefinite semantic force. Though not explicitly stated, a close reading also indicates that he believed qualitativeness may exist by itself. When considering Mark 12:35, Harner says, "the predicate noun could be interpreted as defininte, indefinite, or qualitative, depending on the particular meaning or emphasis which we understand the passage to have" (IBID, p. 79).
Harner found that 80% of anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in Mark and John are qualitative and 20% are definite. None are exclusively indefinite, which supports Colwell's conclusion as well. Harner notes that some qualitative nouns, such as HAMARTÔLOS ("sinner") in John 8:31, though best translated with the indefinite article due to English idiom, should actually be considered qualitative:
Again the qualitative aspect of the predicate is most prominent; they [the Jews] think that Jesus has the nature or character of one who is "sinner." There is no basis for regarding the predicate as definite, although in this instance we would probably use the indefinite article in English translation (IBID, p. 83).
Harner stresses that when considering whether a pre-verbal predicate noun is definite, indefinite, or qualitative, it is important to consider how the writer might have expressed his intentions using another, and possibly less ambiguous, syntax as well as what he actually wrote. Thus, with John 1:1c, Harner notes the following possibilities:
A. hO LOGOS ÊN hO THEOS
B. THEOS ÊN hO LOGOS
C. hO LOGOS THEOS ÊN
D. hO LOGOS ÊN THEOS
E. hO LOGOS ÊN THEIOS
The omission of the article shows that the speaker regards the person or thing not so much as this or that person or thing, but rather as such a person or thing, i.e. regards not the individual but rather nature or quality. (Zerwick, p. 55, emphasis in original).
Zerwick conflates qualitative and indefinite nouns into a single category and places THEOS in John 1:1c in that category:
for in the nature of things, the predicate commonly refers not to an individual or individuals as such, but to the class to which the subject belongs, to the nature or quality predicated of the subject; e.g. Jo 1,1 , which attributes to the Word the divine nature (, at least in NT usage, would signify personal identity of the Word with the Father, since the latter is ) (IBID).
In fact, this one mention of "class" is the only time Zerwick may be inferred to understand indefiniteness to be present in an anarthrous noun at all. His entire discussion of the non-use of the article centers on the qualitative aspects ascribed to the subject. Thus, for Zerwick, nouns are either definite or qualitative, and membership in a class is secondary to the attributes, characteristics, or qualities ascribed to the subject when the author omits the article.
Clause A, with an arthrous predicate, would mean that logos and theos are equivalent and interchangeable. There would be no ho theos which is not also ho logos. But this equation of the two would contradict the preceding clause of 1:1, i
Blass, Debrunner, and Funk
The Blass and Debrunner grammar, translated and revised by Robert Funk, generally endorses Colwell's study, but notes: "[Colwell] deals only with sentences in which the verb appears and only with nouns which are unambiguously definite" (BDF, p. 143). The latter point will be developed in greater detail by Dixon (see below) with regard to the application of Colwell's Rule and John 1:1c. Blass and Debrunner have little to say about predicate nouns which lack the article, but in reference to Mark 7:15 remark: "the idea which runs through the whole discourse is that there really is something which produces this effect, and this given category is now referred to a particular subject" (IBID). Thus, it may be inferred that Blass and Debrunner view anarthrous nouns in much the same was as Zerwick, primarily ascribing qualities or characteristics to the subject rather than membership in a class (the category itself is "referred" to the subject - the subject is not said to be placed in the category).
Lane McGaughy
McGaughy's published dissertation on the use of the Greek verb EINAI ("to be") has been widely recognized for its thoroughness. McGaughy examines Colwell's statistics and finds several of the "exceptions" to his rule that Colwell noted are, in fact, not exceptions at all. Thus several scholars have recognized McGaughy as supporting Colwell's conclusion that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (e.g., Carson, p. 137) or has even given it greater weight (e.g., Grudem, p. 234, n. 12 ). McGaughy says that John 1:1 "should be translated 'And the Word was God' rather than 'And the Word was divine'" (McGaughy, p. 77). He cites Zerwick approvingly: "A noun preceding the verb and lacking the article should not be regarded as 'qualitative' on the mere grounds of the absence of the article" (IBID). Interestingly, McGaughy has not, to my knowledge, addressed Harner's article (which appeared one year after McGaughy's study), which distinguishes between a qualitative meaning and the weaker adjectival "divine" which McGaughy argues against.
Phillip B. Harner
The impact of Phillip B. Harner's study of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns on the interpretation of John 1:1 cannot be overemphasized. Harner noted that "Colwell was almost entirely concerned with the question whether anarthrous predicate nouns were definite or indefinite, and he did not discuss at any length the problem of their qualitative significance" (Harner, p. 76). Again, Colwell, like most older grammarians, saw qualitative nouns as more or less the same as indefinite nouns.
Harner argues that qualitativeness should be considered a semantic force in its own right:
This study will suggest that anarthrous predicate nouns preceding the verb may function primarily to express the nature or character of the subject, and this qualitative significance may be more important that the question whether the predicate noun itself should be regarded as definite or indefinite (IBID, p. 75).
Harner says that qualitativeness may coexist with either a definite or indefinite semantic force. Though not explicitly stated, a close reading also indicates that he believed qualitativeness may exist by itself. When considering Mark 12:35, Harner says, "the predicate noun could be interpreted as defininte, indefinite, or qualitative, depending on the particular meaning or emphasis which we understand the passage to have" (IBID, p. 79).
Harner found that 80% of anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in Mark and John are qualitative and 20% are definite. None are exclusively indefinite, which supports Colwell's conclusion as well. Harner notes that some qualitative nouns, such as HAMARTÔLOS ("sinner") in John 8:31, though best translated with the indefinite article due to English idiom, should actually be considered qualitative:
Again the qualitative aspect of the predicate is most prominent; they [the Jews] think that Jesus has the nature or character of one who is "sinner." There is no basis for regarding the predicate as definite, although in this instance we would probably use the indefinite article in English translation (IBID, p. 83).
Harner stresses that when considering whether a pre-verbal predicate noun is definite, indefinite, or qualitative, it is important to consider how the writer might have expressed his intentions using another, and possibly less ambiguous, syntax as well as what he actually wrote. Thus, with John 1:1c, Harner notes the following possibilities:
A. hO LOGOS ÊN hO THEOS
B. THEOS ÊN hO LOGOS
C. hO LOGOS THEOS ÊN
D. hO LOGOS ÊN THEOS
E. hO LOGOS ÊN THEIOS
which John writes that. This clause suggests relationship, and thus some form of "personal" differentiation, between the two (IBID, p. 84-85).
So, Harner, in agreement with Robertson, Dana & Mantey, and most other scholars cited above, notes that if both THEOS and LOGOS were articular, the two terms would be convertible. Since John did not use this syntax, his intended meaning must be something else. Harner continues:
Clause D, with the verb preceding an anarthrous predicate, would probably mean that the logos was "a god" or a divine being of some kind, belonging to the general category of theos but as a distinct being from ho theos. Clause E would be an attenuated form of D. It would mean that the logos was "divine," without specifying further in what way or to what extent it was divine. It could also imply that the logos, being only theios, was subordinate to theos (IBID).
Thus, Harner notes that had John wished to express the idea that the LOGOS was "a god," or a divine being distinct from hO THEOS, he had at least two unambiguous ways of doing so. Since he did not, we may conclude that John in all likelihood chose the syntax he did because he wished to express something else with regard to the LOGOS.
Clauses B and C, with an anarthrous predicate preceding the verb, are primarily qualitative in meaning. They indicate that the logos has the nature of theos. There is no basis for regarding the predicate theos as definite. This would make B and C equivalent to A, and like A they would then contradict the preceding clause of 1:1 (IBID).
Note here that Harner equates a definite semantic force in a pre-verbal PN without the article to an articular noun. He sees both forms as examples of a convertible proposition. This is the major point of contention between scholars who regard THEOS in 1:1c as definite as opposed to those who see it as qualitative. Scholars on both sides interpret this clause in more or less the same way, as Harner himself notes: "In many cases their [commentators'] interpretations agree with the explanation that is given above" (IBID). Those who agree with Harner reject a definite force because they view it as semantically the same as a convertible proposition, which would present problems with regard to the previous clause (1:1b). Those who view THEOS as definite believe the absence of the article precludes the the possibility of convertibility. Yet both generally agree that the meaning of 1:1c is as Harner himself translates it: "The Word had the same nature as God" (IBID, p. 87).
So, Harner, in agreement with Robertson, Dana & Mantey, and most other scholars cited above, notes that if both THEOS and LOGOS were articular, the two terms would be convertible. Since John did not use this syntax, his intended meaning must be something else. Harner continues:
Clause D, with the verb preceding an anarthrous predicate, would probably mean that the logos was "a god" or a divine being of some kind, belonging to the general category of theos but as a distinct being from ho theos. Clause E would be an attenuated form of D. It would mean that the logos was "divine," without specifying further in what way or to what extent it was divine. It could also imply that the logos, being only theios, was subordinate to theos (IBID).
Thus, Harner notes that had John wished to express the idea that the LOGOS was "a god," or a divine being distinct from hO THEOS, he had at least two unambiguous ways of doing so. Since he did not, we may conclude that John in all likelihood chose the syntax he did because he wished to express something else with regard to the LOGOS.
Clauses B and C, with an anarthrous predicate preceding the verb, are primarily qualitative in meaning. They indicate that the logos has the nature of theos. There is no basis for regarding the predicate theos as definite. This would make B and C equivalent to A, and like A they would then contradict the preceding clause of 1:1 (IBID).
Note here that Harner equates a definite semantic force in a pre-verbal PN without the article to an articular noun. He sees both forms as examples of a convertible proposition. This is the major point of contention between scholars who regard THEOS in 1:1c as definite as opposed to those who see it as qualitative. Scholars on both sides interpret this clause in more or less the same way, as Harner himself notes: "In many cases their [commentators'] interpretations agree with the explanation that is given above" (IBID). Those who agree with Harner reject a definite force because they view it as semantically the same as a convertible proposition, which would present problems with regard to the previous clause (1:1b). Those who view THEOS as definite believe the absence of the article precludes the the possibility of convertibility. Yet both generally agree that the meaning of 1:1c is as Harner himself translates it: "The Word had the same nature as God" (IBID, p. 87).
Harner continues:
As John has just spoken in terms of relationship and differentiation between ho logos and ho theos, he would imply in B or C that they share the same nature as belonging to the reality theos. Clauses B and C are identical in meaning but differ slightly in emphasis. C would mean that the logos (rather than something else) had the nature of theos. B means that the logos had the nature of theos (rather than something else). In this clause, the form that John actually uses, the word theos is placed at the beginning for emphasis (IBID, p. 85).
Thus, Harner says that not only is John attributing the nature of THEOS to the LOGOS, but emphasizes that nature by placing THEOS at the head of the clause. The emphasis of THEOS would seem unaccountable if John intended an indefinite nuance, but is perfectly understandable if THEOS is qualitative, signifying that the Son's nature is that of God.
Paul Dixon
Dixon's study is the first of several to challenge the popular application of Colwell's rule. Dixon notes that Colwell's data begins with definite PNs and demonstrates that these usually lack the article. However, those using the rule to "prove" that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (including Colwell himself!) are not actually citing Colwell's rule, but it's converse:
The rule does not say: an anarthrous predicate nominative which precedes the verb is definite. This is the converse of Colwell's rule and as such is not a valid inference....from the statement "Definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb are anarthrous," it is not valid to infer "Anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb are definite" (Dixon, pp. 11-12).
Colwell himself affirmed that the converse of the rule was as valid as the rule itself, and said that anarthrous pre-verbal PNs would normally be definite (Wallace, p. 259). Like Harner, Dixon considers qualitativeness a semantic force in addition to definiteness and indefiniteness. While Harner says that qualitativeness may exist either independently or along with definiteness or indefiniteness, Dixon argues that only one of these three semantic forces is the author's intended meaning in any given instance:
The whole notion that a noun can have two or more simultaneous nuances as used in a particular context is rather like saying a word can have two or more simultaneous meanings when used in a particular context. There is no question that a word can have two or more meanings, but when it is actually used by an author it almost always has a particular meaning, unless he is intentionally employing a double entendre (perhaps like KEFALÊN in 1 Cor 11:5). Likewise, we can assume an author has a particular nuance of a noun being used and is not intentionally being ambiguous so as to confuse the reader (Dixon, message posted on b-greek discussion list on the Internet, Friday, March 2, 2001).
Dixon's statistical methodology, unlike Colwells', was to begin with anarthrous PNs (as opposed to only examining those PNs which were definite), and determine the semantic force of each. His statistical analysis substantiates Harner's findings: "When the anarthrous predicate nominative precedes the verb it is qualitative in 50 of 53 occurrences, or 94% probability" (Dixon). Dixon concludes:
As John has just spoken in terms of relationship and differentiation between ho logos and ho theos, he would imply in B or C that they share the same nature as belonging to the reality theos. Clauses B and C are identical in meaning but differ slightly in emphasis. C would mean that the logos (rather than something else) had the nature of theos. B means that the logos had the nature of theos (rather than something else). In this clause, the form that John actually uses, the word theos is placed at the beginning for emphasis (IBID, p. 85).
Thus, Harner says that not only is John attributing the nature of THEOS to the LOGOS, but emphasizes that nature by placing THEOS at the head of the clause. The emphasis of THEOS would seem unaccountable if John intended an indefinite nuance, but is perfectly understandable if THEOS is qualitative, signifying that the Son's nature is that of God.
Paul Dixon
Dixon's study is the first of several to challenge the popular application of Colwell's rule. Dixon notes that Colwell's data begins with definite PNs and demonstrates that these usually lack the article. However, those using the rule to "prove" that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (including Colwell himself!) are not actually citing Colwell's rule, but it's converse:
The rule does not say: an anarthrous predicate nominative which precedes the verb is definite. This is the converse of Colwell's rule and as such is not a valid inference....from the statement "Definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb are anarthrous," it is not valid to infer "Anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb are definite" (Dixon, pp. 11-12).
Colwell himself affirmed that the converse of the rule was as valid as the rule itself, and said that anarthrous pre-verbal PNs would normally be definite (Wallace, p. 259). Like Harner, Dixon considers qualitativeness a semantic force in addition to definiteness and indefiniteness. While Harner says that qualitativeness may exist either independently or along with definiteness or indefiniteness, Dixon argues that only one of these three semantic forces is the author's intended meaning in any given instance:
The whole notion that a noun can have two or more simultaneous nuances as used in a particular context is rather like saying a word can have two or more simultaneous meanings when used in a particular context. There is no question that a word can have two or more meanings, but when it is actually used by an author it almost always has a particular meaning, unless he is intentionally employing a double entendre (perhaps like KEFALÊN in 1 Cor 11:5). Likewise, we can assume an author has a particular nuance of a noun being used and is not intentionally being ambiguous so as to confuse the reader (Dixon, message posted on b-greek discussion list on the Internet, Friday, March 2, 2001).
Dixon's statistical methodology, unlike Colwells', was to begin with anarthrous PNs (as opposed to only examining those PNs which were definite), and determine the semantic force of each. His statistical analysis substantiates Harner's findings: "When the anarthrous predicate nominative precedes the verb it is qualitative in 50 of 53 occurrences, or 94% probability" (Dixon). Dixon concludes:
We may conclude three things about John 1:1. First, Colwell's rule cannot be applied to the verse as an argument for definiteness. Colwell's rule says that definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are anarthrous. The rule says nothing about definiteness. It does not say that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are definite. This is the converse of the rule, and as such is not necessarily valid. Indeed, our thesis demonstrates just the opposite, that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are qualitative, 94% of occurrences. Second, on the basis of the contrast with 1:14 (where the humanity of Christ is stressed), we conclude that THEOS in 1:1c stresses quality. Third, this thesis demonstrates that the statistical probability for THEOS being qualitative, rather than definite or indefinite, is quite high, 94% (IBID).
Daniel B. Wallace
In his intermediate Greek grammar, Wallace accepts Harner's definition of the qualitative semantic force, and provides a number of examples outside of John 1:1. Wallace, like Harner, advocates qualitativeness as a separate semantic category, either coexisting alongside definite or indefinite semantic forces or existing by itself. Citing Harner and Dixon, Wallace concludes that THEOS in John 1:1 is qualitative, and finds the indefinite semantic force the least likely for preverbal predicate nominatives. Though Wallace says that "the Word was divine" may be an acceptable translation, this is only acceptable if we define "divine" in such a way that it is only applied to true Deity. The import of the qualitative force goes well beyond what we commonly would refer to as "divine" in contemporary usage:
The idea of qualitative here is that the Word had all the attributes and qualities that "the God" (of 1:1b) had. In other words, he shared the essence of the Father, though they differed in person. The construction the evangelist chose to express this idea was the most concise way he could have stated that the Word was God and yet was distinct from the Father (Wallace, p. 269, emphasis in original).
Daniel B. Wallace
In his intermediate Greek grammar, Wallace accepts Harner's definition of the qualitative semantic force, and provides a number of examples outside of John 1:1. Wallace, like Harner, advocates qualitativeness as a separate semantic category, either coexisting alongside definite or indefinite semantic forces or existing by itself. Citing Harner and Dixon, Wallace concludes that THEOS in John 1:1 is qualitative, and finds the indefinite semantic force the least likely for preverbal predicate nominatives. Though Wallace says that "the Word was divine" may be an acceptable translation, this is only acceptable if we define "divine" in such a way that it is only applied to true Deity. The import of the qualitative force goes well beyond what we commonly would refer to as "divine" in contemporary usage:
The idea of qualitative here is that the Word had all the attributes and qualities that "the God" (of 1:1b) had. In other words, he shared the essence of the Father, though they differed in person. The construction the evangelist chose to express this idea was the most concise way he could have stated that the Word was God and yet was distinct from the Father (Wallace, p. 269, emphasis in original).
Don Hartley
One of the possible objections to Wallace's advocacy of qualitativeness as by far the most likely semantic force (apart from a concurrent definite or indefinite nuance) is that most of the examples he provides are "mass" nouns. Mass nouns are those that cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized (that is, that cannot be used with the indefinite article, and for which there is no plural form). "Flesh," is a mass term - we would not say "a flesh," nor "fleshes." A "count" noun, on the other hand, is a noun that can be used with the indefinite article and for which there is a plural form. "Dog" is a count noun - we can say "a dog," or "dogs." Simply put, a count noun is something that can be counted; a mass term is one that cannot. We can count dogs but not flesh. Some have argued that mass terms differ dramatically from count terms in the semantic force they can convey (it is sometimes argued that count terms must always be definite or indefinite and that there is no such thing as a "qualitative count noun").1 Because it is generally conceded that mass terms can exude a qualitative force, it has been argued that the statistical analyses of Harner and Dixon are weighed unfairly towards qualitative nouns, particularly when applying those statistics to THEOS, which is a count noun.
Don Hartley, a student of Dan Wallace's and research assistant on Wallace's grammar, wrote his Master's of Theology thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary on the topic of Colwell's Construction and mass / count nouns. He also published a paper derived from his thesis. Hartley's methodology is to examine every example of Colwell's Construction in the Greek New Testament. Hartley purposely leaves controversial or questionable nouns out of this sample. He then eliminates all factors that would unfairly weigh the sample towards one semantic force, such as mass terms. He carefully identifies all potential semantic forces - following Wallace, Hartley advocates qualitativeness as either a standalone semantic force, or as one that can coexist alongside definite or indefinite forces. He notes that all mass terms exude a purely qualitative force (John 1:14, for example, does not teach that the Logos became The Flesh or a flesh, but rather "flesh," signifying that all the Logos possesses all the qualities or attributes of "flesh"). He therefore concludes that qualitativeness is a valid semantic category apart from definiteness or indefiniteness, and argues that this force may be applied equally to mass or count terms.
Hartley's results demonstrate that in John's Gospel, a preverbal PN is usually qualitative (56%), as opposed to definite (11%), indefninte (17%), or qualitative-indefinite (17%). He concludes that from the standpoint of pure statistical analysis, THEOS in John 1:1c is most likely qualitative: "Thus, Jesus is God in every sense the Father is" (Hartley, p. 40).
Conclusion
While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.
It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case. The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.
Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:
"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, God."
One of the possible objections to Wallace's advocacy of qualitativeness as by far the most likely semantic force (apart from a concurrent definite or indefinite nuance) is that most of the examples he provides are "mass" nouns. Mass nouns are those that cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized (that is, that cannot be used with the indefinite article, and for which there is no plural form). "Flesh," is a mass term - we would not say "a flesh," nor "fleshes." A "count" noun, on the other hand, is a noun that can be used with the indefinite article and for which there is a plural form. "Dog" is a count noun - we can say "a dog," or "dogs." Simply put, a count noun is something that can be counted; a mass term is one that cannot. We can count dogs but not flesh. Some have argued that mass terms differ dramatically from count terms in the semantic force they can convey (it is sometimes argued that count terms must always be definite or indefinite and that there is no such thing as a "qualitative count noun").1 Because it is generally conceded that mass terms can exude a qualitative force, it has been argued that the statistical analyses of Harner and Dixon are weighed unfairly towards qualitative nouns, particularly when applying those statistics to THEOS, which is a count noun.
Don Hartley, a student of Dan Wallace's and research assistant on Wallace's grammar, wrote his Master's of Theology thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary on the topic of Colwell's Construction and mass / count nouns. He also published a paper derived from his thesis. Hartley's methodology is to examine every example of Colwell's Construction in the Greek New Testament. Hartley purposely leaves controversial or questionable nouns out of this sample. He then eliminates all factors that would unfairly weigh the sample towards one semantic force, such as mass terms. He carefully identifies all potential semantic forces - following Wallace, Hartley advocates qualitativeness as either a standalone semantic force, or as one that can coexist alongside definite or indefinite forces. He notes that all mass terms exude a purely qualitative force (John 1:14, for example, does not teach that the Logos became The Flesh or a flesh, but rather "flesh," signifying that all the Logos possesses all the qualities or attributes of "flesh"). He therefore concludes that qualitativeness is a valid semantic category apart from definiteness or indefiniteness, and argues that this force may be applied equally to mass or count terms.
Hartley's results demonstrate that in John's Gospel, a preverbal PN is usually qualitative (56%), as opposed to definite (11%), indefninte (17%), or qualitative-indefinite (17%). He concludes that from the standpoint of pure statistical analysis, THEOS in John 1:1c is most likely qualitative: "Thus, Jesus is God in every sense the Father is" (Hartley, p. 40).
Conclusion
While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.
It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case. The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.
Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:
"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, God."
It was written by Greek Scholars full of the Holy Spirit including some from UPC Jesus Only Scholars.
I know this because I worked with them Personally.
David K. Bernard
Brent Coltharp, DSL
David Johnson, M.T.S
Gary Erickson, D.Min.
David Norris, Ph.D.
Jeffrey Brickle, Ph.D.
Chris Paris, Ph.D.
David Sang-Ehil Han
Rev. Gerald Grant
William K. Kay
Sis. Ageane Reed
Rev. Jack Leaman
There are more
I know this because I worked with them Personally.
David K. Bernard
Brent Coltharp, DSL
David Johnson, M.T.S
Gary Erickson, D.Min.
David Norris, Ph.D.
Jeffrey Brickle, Ph.D.
Chris Paris, Ph.D.
David Sang-Ehil Han
Rev. Gerald Grant
William K. Kay
Sis. Ageane Reed
Rev. Jack Leaman
There are more